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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW

During the period of this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals continued its traditional role as an important forum for legal issues
involving public lands and natural resources, such as federal regulation
of water development to protect endangered species' and the implied
duties of an oil and gas lessee to a lessor when forming a unitization
agreement. 2 This article will discuss seven of the most significant public
lands and natural resources cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during
this survey period. These decisions dealt almost entirely with statutory
and regulatory issues, pointing to the continued dominance of the administrative agencies in this field.
I.

A.

SECTION 404 PERMITS

Background

The regulation of dredge and fill activities has been one of the most
controversial regulatory programs resulting from the plethora of environmental statutes enacted in the 1960's and 1970's. 3 However, regulation of the dumping of refuse, including dredge and fill material, into
the nation's waterways has been in existence since 1899 under the Riv4
ers and Harbors Act (RHA).
Until the 1960's, regulation under the RHA was primarily concerned with navigational hazards. 5 In 1968, the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), which has responsibility for issuing permits for the
1. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Jacobs, 746 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1984).
3. Since its enactment, section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982),
has been litigated in numerous instances. For a comprehensive discussion of section 404
cases involving wetlands, see Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the Problems, 8 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1984). Among the statutes which resulted in controversial environmental regulatory programs were the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982); the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), as amended by the FWPCA Amendment of
1972 and the Clean Water Act Amendment of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) (of
which section 404 is a part) (The 1972 amendment completely replaced the FWPCA and it
is now commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act.); and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
4. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982) (known as the
Refuse Act of 1899). The Act provides that:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause ... to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill
of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that
flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any
navigable water of the United States or into any tributary of any navigable water
from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water.
Id.
5. See Note, Water Law--When Water Quantity Regulation is Not Water Quantity Regulation,
20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 523, 524 (1985).
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disposal of dredged or fill material, broadened the scope of its permit
review to include public interest factors, such as environmental considerations. 6 In 1970, the Fifth Circuit specifically upheld the Corps' inclu7
sion of environmental considerations in the permit issuance process.
When the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water
Act) was amended in 1972,8 Congress, recognizing the Corps' longstanding role in regulating dredge and fill activities, enacted section
404, which reaffirmed the Corps' authority to issue permits for depositing dredge and fill materials which the Clean Water Act defines as
pollutants.9
The Clean Water Act expanded the scope of the permitting process
beyond the "navigable waters" limitation of the RHA to include all the
"waters of the United States."' 0 Initially the Corps was unwilling to expand its jurisdiction but was finally forced to do so as a result of Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Calloway,"I which held that Congress had
defined "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act so as to extend
"federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent
permissible under the Commerce Clause.... [Als used in the Water Act,
12
the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability."'
Under section 404, the guidelines for issuing perm its are established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)13 and the regulatory procedures for reviewing permits require the consideration of many
factors, including a variety of environmental effects. 14 The Corps is also
required to consider related statutory guidelines, such as those set out
in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' 5 and the Endangered
16
Species Act (ESA).
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit decided two important
section 404 permit controversies. In Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 17 the court decided whether the Corps had the authority to deny a
section 404 permit on the basis of indirect effects of the operation of a
proposed dam. In Utah v. Marsh, 18 the court resolved a constitutional
challenge to the reach of section 404 permits by holding that the permit
requirement extends to a landlocked, intrastate lake.
6. See Want, supra note 3, at 5 n.39; see also Note, supra note 5, at 525.
7. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). See Note, supra note 5, at 525.
8. Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1982).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). The Corps' current regulatory definition of"navigable waters" (waters capable of transport of interstate or foreign commerce) under the
RHA appears at 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1985).
11. 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
12. Id. at 686.
13. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1). See Liebesman, The Role of EPA's Guidelines in the Clean
Water Act § 404 Permit Program-JudicialInterpretationand Administrative Application, 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. 10272 (1984).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

40 C.F.R. § 230 (1985).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532-1543
758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir.
740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir.

(1982). See Note, supra note 5, at 530.
(1982). See Note, supra note 5, at 530-31.
1985).
1984).
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Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews
1. Background

In this long-awaited opinion 19 the court decided whether the Corps
exceeded its authority by denying the Riverside Irrigation District (the
District) and the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC) the authority to operate under a nationwide permit for the deposit of fill material
(basically sand and gravel) under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 20
The District planned to build a dam on Wildcat Creek, a tributary of the
South Platte River. The stored water was to be used to cool a large
adjoining power plant owned by PSC, as well as for irrigation. 2 1 Because Wildcat Creek is a part of the "waters of the United States" as
defined in the Clean Water Act, 2 2 the District had to obtain a permit for
depositing the fill material necessary for construction of the earthen
2
dam. 3

Under the section 404 permit guidelines, nationwide permits issued
by the Corps automatically allow for the deposit of dredge and fill
materials without an individual application for a permit, 24 provided that
certain conditions are met.2 5 Although the planned deposits met most
of the conditions, the Corps denied the District's claim that its activities
came under the nationwide permit because the increased consumption
of water by the proposed reservoir would deplete the streamflow and
thereby affect an important riparian habitat of the whooping crane, an
endangered species, located approximately 250 miles downstream. 26
The Corps initially required the District to take one of two mitigation
measures. The first required replacement of the water consumed by the
reservoir and the second required the improvement and maintenance by
the District of the whooping crane habitat. 27 The failure of the District
to implement either of these mitigation measures would trigger the requirement that the District apply for an individual permit under section
404 and comply with the requisite public notice and hearings
19. Riverside began to take form on June 6, 1978, when a Fish and Wildlife Service
employee contacted the Corps about the planned dam. Riverside Irrigation District v.
Stipo, 658 F.2d 762, 764 (1981). The implications of the case brought it to the attention
of many commentators during the course of the litigation process. See, e.g., Parish and
Morgan, History, Practiceand Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation: Reconsidering Section 404

of the Clean Water Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 76 n.129 (1982); Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1985); Want, supra

note 3, at 23; Note, supra note 5; G. Hobbs, The Endangered Species Act and State Water
Allocation Systems: Conflict and Resolution In the Platte River and Colorado River Basins
(April 1985) (This paper was presented at "Water and Colorado's Future, Who Turns the
Tap?," A Conference of Continuing Legal Education in Colorado, Inc.) (on file at the
Denver University Law Review offices)[hereinafter cited as G. Hobbs].
20. 758 F.2d at 510-11.
21. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762, 763 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. 758 F.2d at 511; see 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1985).
23. 758 F.2d at 511.
24. 658 F.2d at 764; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1982); 33 C.F.R. § 330 (1985).
25. 33 C.F.R. § 330.4-5(b) (1985).
26. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 585 (D. Colo. 1983).
27. 658 F.2d at 766.
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requirements 28
The District brought suit in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and review of the agency action. It claimed
that the Corps exceeded its authority by considering effects other than
the effect of placing fill materials. 29 An interlocutory appeal to the
Tenth Circuit was taken by the Corps after the trial court refused to
dismiss the suit for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court held that there was jurisdiction for judicial review because the Corps' action clearly denied the District the right to
proceed under a nationwide permit. In addition, the court noted that it
was unrealistic to expect the District to proceed with construction in order to test the permitting process, given the severe penalties such a
30
course of action would entail.
The case was then remanded to the district court for a "determination whether the [Corps] has exceeded [its] statutory authority."' 3 1 The
district court held that the Corps had acted within its authority and was
required by both the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
to deny permission to operate under the nationwide permit.3 2

The

Tenth Circuit, Judge McKay writing, affirmed the district court's opinion, stating that the plaintiffs had failed to show compliance with all the
requirements of the nationwide permit and, therefore, had to apply for
33

an individual permit.

2.

The Endangered Species Act and Section 404

The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact that a nationwide permit is conditioned on the discharge not destroying or adversely affecting the critical habitat of a threatened or endangered species. 34 In addition, the
court found that the Corps has the authority to require an individual
permit because the pertinent guidelines require the agency to look at all
effects on the "aquatic environment" caused by the depositing of the fill
35
material.
What sets this case apart from most section 404 permit cases is that
the adverse effect was associated with the eventual use of the dam and
not with the placing of the fill materials in the stream. 3 6 Thus, the
Corps sought to establish its authority to regulate not only the water
quality effects of dredge and fill activities, but also the downstream effects of changes in water quantity resulting from dredge and fill activities. The court found that the Corps' focus on streamflow depletions
resulting from dredge and fill activities did not change the review re28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
758 F.2d at 511.
658 F.2d at 767.
Id. at 768.
568 F. Supp. 583, 589 (D. Colo. 1983).
758 F.2d 508, 513-14 (10th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 511; see 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(b)(2) (1985).
758 F.2d at 512 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(E) (1982)).
758 F.2d at 511-12.
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quired by the ESA.1 7 The court quoted from TVA v. Hill:3 8 "[F]ederal
agencies [must] 'insure that actions authorized .

.

. by them do not . . .

result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of [endan'3 9
gered] species... .' This language admits of no exception."
The Clean Water Act and its accompanying regulations contain language authorizing the consideration of water quantity effects as well as
water quality effects. 40 The court stated that because the ESA and the
Clean Water Act require the Corps to consider all environmental impacts of a discharge, requiring the Corps to ignore indirect effects would
be "to require it to wear blinders that Congress has not chosen to
4
impose." I
3.

The Wallop Amendment and the Interstate Compact

The District further argued that the denial of a permit violated section 101(g) of the Clean Water Act (the Wallop Amendment), 4 2 which
does not allow a state's right to allocate water within its jurisdiction to
be impaired. Citing Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,43 the court held that a general policy statement "cannot nullify a
clear and specific grant of jurisdiction .... ,,44 The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the Wallop Amendment evidenced a congressional
intent that an accommodation be reached when a state's right to allocate
water interferes with the federal interest in environmental protection
and held that the individual permit was the best method of accommodating the conflicting interests. 4 5 The court also found that the Corps' denial of the nationwide permit did not deny Colorado its right to use the
water allocated by the South Platte River Compact, but instead only re46
quired an application for an individual permit.

37. Id.; see also National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 373-74 (5th
Cir.) (where a federal agency was required to consider both direct and indirect effect of
proposed highway construction on a crane habitat as part of its duty under section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978) (where the court invalidated an individual section 404 permit for a failure to assure that adequate streamflow to
the whooping crane habitat would be maintained), appeal vacatedand dismissed, 594 F.2d 870
(8th Cir. 1979).
38. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
39. Id. at 173 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
40. 758 F.2d at 512.
41. Id.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 12 51(g) (1982). The Wallop Amendment provides that:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities
of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise
impaired by this [Act]. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this
[Act] shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. Federal agencies shall cooperate with
State and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources.
Id.
43. 324 U.S. 515 (1945).
44. 758 F.2d at 513 (quoting Connecticut Light & Power, 324 U.S. at 527)).
45. 758 F.2d at 513.
46. Id. at 513-14.
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Analysis
7

4
Riverside arose after Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration,
which also concerned a dam project along the Platte River system. In
that case the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) requested a consultation
with the REA under section 7 of the ESA. The FWS made a determination that the proposed Greyrock Dam could jeopardize the continued
existence of the endangered whooping crane by affecting the same criti48
cal habitat involved in Riverside.

Prior to the beginning of construction of the Wildcat Creek dam,
formal consultation between the FWS and the Corps was initiated under
the ESA. The FWS thereafter issued a biological opinion that concluded
that the project would have an adverse effect on the cranes' critical
49
habitat.
Work by the Platte River Whooping Crane Habitat Maintenance
Trust (the Trust), however, has suggested that high water runoff into the
Platte River can actually destroy the roosting sites of the cranes. Furthermore, the Trust has also determined that the scouring action of the
river, which keeps the sandbars and meadows on which the cranes roost
free of vegetation, can be duplicated by mechanical means. 50 Therefore, ironically, the control of runoff by dams on Platte River tributaries
may be beneficial to the cranes' habitat.
The Tenth Circuit, however, did not decide the case on the merits
of the adverse impact claim, but instead on the District's failure to show
"that the [discharge] will not destroy a threatened or endangered species
as identified in the Endangered Species Act or destroy or adversely
modify the critical habitat of such species."15 ' Because of the limited
scope of the court's ruling, the District may still be able to construct the
Wildcat Creek project if it is able to acquire an individual permit,
although it clearly will be difficult for the District to overcome the FWS's
determination of possible adverse effect. However, given the research
findings of the Trust, 5 2 further study may show that the District can proceed with the project without endangering the whooping cranes or their
habitat.
The most significant aspect of Riverside is the recognition of the
Corps' right to regulate the instream flow of rivers under the section
47. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1156 (D. Neb. 1978), appeal vacated and dismissed, 594
F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
48. 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1170.
49. 658 F.2d at 764.
50. G. Hobbs, supra note 19, at 3-4. The Platte River Whooping Crane Maintenance
Trust was established as a result of a settlement following the Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Association decision. The Trust has acquired 6,000 acres of land along the Platte River
within the whooping crane habitat with the intention of maintaining the habitat. The
Trust's work has shown that the cranes cannot stand in water deeper that eight inches and
that high runoff in 1983 and 1984 destroyed roosting sites within the habitat.
51. 758 F.2d at 514 (emphasis added) (citing 33 C.F.R. § 330.4(b)(2) (1985)).
52. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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404 permit process. 53 Thus, the federal government has the power,
through a section 404 permit, to establish a minimum instream flow requirement. This new "regulatory property right" 54 is understandably
threatening to water rights owners comfortable with decisions that have
generally limited federal rights to claim reserved instream flows for federal reservations. 55 Furthermore, the threat of a denial of a section 404
permit and the restraints associated with possible mitigation measures
could drastically limit plans for new water developments with an associ56
ated effect on a state's water allocation plans.
In addition, the court has reinforced the legitimacy of using the section 404 permit process as a forcing mechanism for the consideration of
environmental impacts on wildlife caused by development of water resources. The definition of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water
Act has extended its provisions to virtually all streams and wetland areas. 5 7 These wetland areas are of immeasurable importance to wildlife,
especially to certain threatened and endangered species that depend on
specific, but rapidly disappearing, wetland environments for survival. 5 8
This decision strengthens and reinforces the Corps' duty to consider all
effects on threatened and endangered species, insuring that the public
interest in preserving an irreplaceable resource is among the initial issues considered in the early stages of construction, thereby discouraging
fiascos like the Tellico Dam. 59 Because the "major federal action" requirements which trigger NEPA60 are not necessary for the section 404
permitting process, any state or private water development project
which involves dredge and fill activity is subject to public scrutiny of its
environmental effects.
C.

Utah v. Marsh

In another section 404 permit case, the Tenth Circuit considered
the constitutionality of the EPA's definition of waters subject to regulation under the section. In Utah v. Marsh 6i the Tenth Circuit affirmed
62
the trial court's summary judgment for the federal government.
During 1978 and 1979, the State of Utah Division of Parks and Recreation (the Parks Division) built several concrete boat launching ramps
53. See Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1, 20-21 (1985).
54. Id. at 3.

55. Id. at 14-15.
56. Id. at 14-19.
57. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1985). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
58.

Note, EnvironmentalLau-Nationwide Permitsfor Categoriesof Waters Issued by the Corps

of Engineers Under FWPCA Section 404: A Legitimate Administrative Interpretation Ratified by Congress?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 904 (1983); see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
59. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Operation of the Tellico Dam was enjoined,
although construction was virtually completed, because it was found that the dam would
threaten the habitat of the snail darter, a small and previously almost unknown species of
fish.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
61. 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 801,805.
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at a marina and boat harbor on Utah Lake. During the construction of
the ramps a small cofferdam was placed in the lake across the mouth of
the boat harbor. After construction was completed the dam was removed and the material was placed in the lake to be used as a foundation
63
for a parking lot.

After the construction was finished, the Parks Division was notified
by the District Engineer of the Army Corps of Engineers that the placement and removal of the dam was a violation of the Clean Water Act
because the state had failed to obtain a permit under section 404.64 The
State of Utah brought suit against the Corps seeking a declaratory judgment that the Corps has no regulatory jurisdiction over Utah Lake and
an injunction against any interference with the state's operations and
activities in, on, and around the lake. Contending that the lake is a navigable body of water with no navigable tributary or outlet extending
outside the state, the state claimed that the lake "is beyond the constitu' 65
tional reach of the regulatory authority of Congress."
The Corps alleged that the lake was subject to its regulatory powers
because the lake affects interstate commerce through non-resident recreation, irrigation of crops sold in interstate commerce, and a commer66
cial fishery that markets its fish in interstate commerce.
Section 404 requires a permit for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters when the activity would bring the waters into a new use, impair their flow or circulation, or reduce their
reach. 6 7 "Navigable waters" as defined in the Clean Water Act means
the "waters of the United States including the territorial seas." '6 8 The
Corps has further defined "waters of the United States" as including "all
... waters ...

such as isolated wetlands and lakes ...

and other waters

that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable
waters of the United States, the degradation of which could affect inter69
state commerce."
The state did not argue that the commerce clause is an improper
measure of the federal government's regulatory power over water, but
instead argued that section 404 goes beyond the bounds of the commerce clause when applied to Utah Lake. The state supported its argument with the standard line of Supreme Court cases concerning federal
regulation of navigable waters. 70 However, the Tenth Circuit pointed
out quite correctly that these cases refer to the definition of "navigable
waters" under the Rivers and Harbors Act and not under the Clean
Water Act.
63.
64.
65.
66.

71

Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id.

67. Id. at 802. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(2) (1982) (section 404).
68. Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
69.
70.
Ogden,
71.

33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(5) (1985) (emphasis added).
740 F.2d at 802-03. This line of cases is based upon the decisions in Gibbons v.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
740 F.2d at 803 n.5.
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The court cited its earlier holding in United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc.72 as support for the constitutionality of the Clean Water Act as an
exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause. The court
73
also cited Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.
as indirect support by the Supreme Court for lower court decisions that
have held that the commerce clause power was broad enough to allow
regulation of environmental hazards. 74 Thus, the court refused to limit
affectCongress' power under the commerce clause to regulate activities
75
ing intrastate waters when interstate commerce is affected.
Although the court did not break any new ground in the opinion,
the issue of what waters are subject to regulation under the Clean Water
Act, and more specifically under section 404, continues to be argued in
the courts 76 and among the commentators. 77 One can only hope that
the breadth and inclusiveness of the court's decision will help to discourage the continued flogging of this particular dead horse.
II.

A.

OIL AND GAS LAW

The "Mutual Participation" Standard in Unitization Programs: Amoco
Production Co. v. Jacobs

Amoco Production Co. v. Jacobs 78 involved the largest production unit
ever attempted in New Mexico and possibly in the United States. The
Bravo Dome Unit is located on what is believed to be a carbon dioxide
bearing formation. This unit is subject to a unitization agreement covering 1,035,000 acres. 79 The unit was originally organized in 1977 by
Amoco Production Co., the plaintiffs in the original declaratory action.
Although Amoco cooperated with other working interest and royalty interest owners in forming the unit, it holds a working interest in seventy80
four percent of the acreage in the unit.
The Jacobs are owners of 2,160 acres that were included in the
Bravo Dome Unit as the result of a 1971 lease with Amoco. 8 1 The Jacobs refused to consent to the unitization agreement and contended
that their land was not included in the unit. They argued that the unitization agreement was invalid because Amoco entered into it in bad
faith. Because the primary term of their lease expired in 1981 without
any drilling or production on their land, they also contended that their
72. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 19791).
73. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
74. 740 F.2d at 804 (citing 452 U.S. at 282 & n.2 1).
75. 740 F.2d at 804.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455 (1985);
Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 776 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1985); Louisiana
Wildlife Fed'n v. York, 761 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1985).
77.

Parish & Morgan, Histoiy, Practiceand Emesging Problems of lVetlands Regulation: Recon-

sidering Section 404 of the Clean 11'aterAct, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 51-52 (1982).
78. 746 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 1395, 1404. The largest unit ever previously formed encompassed 400,000
acres.
80. Id. at 1395-96.

81. Id.

426
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82
lease with Amoco had expired.
Amoco relied on a provision in the lease that compelled the Jacobs
to consent to any unitization or pooling agreements. The pooling and
expire or termiunitization clause also stated that the lease would not
83
nate during the life of the unit plan of development.
In New Mexico, for a unitization plan to be valid it must be approved by "any governmental authority."' 84 Amoco submitted its plan
to the State Commissioner of Public Lands (Lands Commissioner) and
to the Director of the United States Geological Survey (USGS). The
Lands Commissioner and the USGS approved the plan after it was considered and approved by the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission
(Commission) .85
TheJacobs filed a petition for rehearing with the Commission which
once again approved the plan, but with additional conditions on the operators to protect the rights of the landowners. The Commission also
in orretained jurisdiction to require further reports from the operators
86
plan.
the
in
changes
and
effects
future
der to consider
Throughout this time the Jacobs refused to consent to their inclusion in the Bravo Dome Unit. Therefore, Amoco sought a declaratory
judgment in federal district court. The district court upheld Amoco's
lease, finding that the unitization agreement lawfully extended the lease
beyond its primary term. The Jacobs appealed this finding to the Tenth
87
Circuit.
Thus, the question on appeal was whether the pooling and unitization clause could validly bind the Jacobs to the unitization plan. The
Jacobs contended that Amoco, in forming the Bravo Dome Unit development plan, abused its authority under the pooling and unitization
clause of the lease. Specifically, theJacobs alleged that Amoco acted in
its own best interest and contrary to the interests of the unit landowners.
They contended that certain provisions of the unit agreement greatly
expanded Amoco's powers under the lease by allowing the working interest holder to set wellhead values and royalty payments on an acreage
the lesbasis, instead of on a source-of-production basis, and expanded
88
sees' right to use the surface of the lessor's property.
The Tenth Circuit, Judge Doyle writing, relied primarily on two earlier Tenth Circuit opinions to set a standard for evaluating unitization
agreements. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson,89 the court laid out a

82. Id. at 1394-95.
83. Id. at 1395.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1395-96.
86. The Oil Commissioner's order was affirmed by the New Mexico District Court and
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Casades v. Oil Commission, No. 14,359 (Nov. 10,
1983). Jacobs, 746 F.2d at 1396.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1397. The Jacobs argued that these provisions allowed self-dealing by
Amoco and reduced the value of the lessors' property.
89. 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
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standard for the behavior of oil companies in dealing with lessors under
a unitization agreement. This standard is one of good faith and due
regard for the interests of the lessors. 90 According to the court, the relationship between the lessor and lessee is "analogous" to that of a principal and an agent and, therefore, there is a duty to exercise a high
degree of good faith and loyalty to the advancement of the principal's
interests. 91
In determining whether Amoco acted in good faith in exercising its
authority to unitize the Jacobs' lease interest, the court analyzed Boone v.
Kerr-McGee Oil Industries.92 In this Tenth Circuit case the lessors had
sought cancellation of oil and gas leases, claiming that the lessee
breached its duty by pooling the acreage under the leases. 9 3 The court
held that the test for validity of unit formation was good faith in honestly
effectuating "the object and purpose the parties had in mind in providing
for the exercise of such power." 94 The Boone court upheld the actions of
the lessee in pooling the leases and held that the law presumes good
95
faith and that bad faith must be affirmatively shown.
Applying these rules to the Jacobs' contentions, the Tenth Circuit
found that bad faith was not proven by showing that the lessee's motivation for pooling the leases was to propel the leases into their secondary
term without having to conduct wasteful drilling on each lease site. 9 6
The court, however, felt that the difference in relative positions of a major oil company involved in the largest unit ever attempted and the
owner of a very small tract within the unit justified a higher standard of
97
behavior on the part of the oil company.
The court was unwilling to adopt the "prudent operator" standard,
which is favored in a minority of gas and oil producing jurisdictions,
because it concluded that a prudent operator was necessarily concerned
primarily with his own needs in developing a unit plan. Thus, the court
held that it would be inequitable to bind lessors to the actions of a lessee
when the lessee could freely disregard the lessors' best interests. 9 8 The
court, however, rejected the Jacobs' argument that Amoco was required
to resolve all conflicts in favor of the lessors. The court instead ruled
that both parties were to be held to a standard of "mutual participation." 99 The court concluded that the good faith standard of Peterson
and Boone could best be implemented by requiring the greatest possible
cooperation between the lessee developing a unit plan and the lessors
90. Jacobs, 746 F.2d at 1398 (quoting Peterson, 218 F.2d at 935).
91. 746 F.2d at 1400.
92. 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
93. 746 F.2d at 1398-99.
94. Id. at 1399 (quoting Boone, 217 F.2d at 65) (emphasis added).
95. 746 F.2d at 1399.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court noted that in such a huge unitization program it was impossible for
the lessee to discharge its duty to the lessor.
98. 746 F.2d at 1401.
99. Id. The court recognized a fiduciary relationship between the principal and agent
in a unitization program.
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affected by the plan.' 0 0
The absence of mutual good faith in the development of the unit
plan by Amoco clearly disturbed the court.' 0 ' Although the court did
not find sufficient evidence of bad faith by Amoco to overturn the district court, it specifically left open to the Jacobs the right to further ac10 2
tion in light of changing conditions.
The court bound the Jacobs to their lease's unitization clause because, in part, the evidence indicated that carbon dioxide production
was such a recent development that there was an insufficient basis for a
showing of bad faith on the part of Amoco. The Commission had
demonstrated its lack of experience with large-field carbon dioxide production by requiring that Amoco continue to report any changing conditions in its development plans.' 0 3 Amoco, despite several years of
development, apparently had yet to drill a paying well in the unit.

10 4

Although the court indicated that more "missionary work" by Amoco
may have avoided this nonproduction problem, the court concluded that
given the uncertainties involved, Amoco's failure to bring the unit into
production was insufficient affirmative proof of bad faith.
In its opinion the Tenth Circuit for the first time clearly established
the duty of a lessee to include the lessors in the development of pooling
and unitization plans as a necessary element of the lessee's burden of
acting in good faith.' 0 5 The court's concern for the interests of the lessors was clearly well founded. The working interest owners under the
Bravo Dome Unit, primarily Amoco, retain virtually all the advantages of
production under the plan. 10 6 Leases, such as the Jacobs', bound the
lessors to whatever conditions were implemented by the oil company
and kept the lease open indefinitely, regardless of whether or not there
0 7
ever was any production.'
There was little evidence of consultation by Amoco with the lessors
whose land was affected by the plan. 10 8 Although the court's standard
of cooperation cannot guarantee the protection of the lessors' interests,
the threat of individual landowners refusing to participate in a plan as
important as Bravo Dome may encourage oil production companies to
deal fairly with the small landowner. Moreover, the court's requirement
of mutuality should not unduly burden the company attempting to form
a unit because the lessors must also act reasonably.
100. Id. at 1401-02.
101. The fact that many years had passed without a successful unitization agreement
supported the court's refusal to apply the "prudent operator" standard. Id. at 1404.
102. Id. at 1406.
103. Id. at 1396, 1404.
104. Id. at 1405.
105. The court disapproved of the original leases providing for a unitization program
in which lessees could act without express approval of individual owners. Id. The court
noted that it might be ditficult to consult the lessor at all times, but that an effort to seek
approval of lessors when possible would be helpful. Id. at 1402.
106. Id. at 1401-02.
107. Id. at 1397.
108. Id. at 1395.
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Favored Nations Clauses: Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co.

In Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 10 9 the Tenth Circuit reviewed a "favored nations clause" in a gas purchase agreement. The
clause provided that if the purchaser, Western Slope Gas Co., entered
into a contract with other sellers for the purchase of gas at a higher
price, it would then pay that higher contract price to Superior and
Conoco. I 10
The court, Judge Seth writing for the majority, held that Colorado
law I ' specifically recognizes all federal natural gas price and allocation
regulations. After noting that the federal Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978'12 (NGPA) permits the continuance of such favored nations
clauses in intrastate gas contracts, the court concluded that Colorado
had not barred such "favored nations" clauses as contrary to public
policy.
Judge Doyle pointed out in his dissent that, although federal law
currently allows the "favored nations" clause, the dispute arose before
the NGPA had been enacted and at a time when such clauses were contrary to public policy. 113 Judge Doyle further argued that the regulatory
approach of the Public Utilities Commission would better protect the
interests of natural gas consumers because price controls based on indefinite price escalation clauses, such as the "favored nations" clause,
would inevitably lead to spiraling gas prices.' 14 The dissent also contended that, because of the noncompetitive nature of the product and
the public's interest in the conservation of non-renewable natural resources, the public interest would best be served by regulation by the
Public Utilities Commission.' 15
Although the dissent raised the important issue of what degree of
government regulation best serves the interests of the consuming public, the outcome of the case was effectively predetermined by Colorado's
clear recognition of the validity of "favored nations" clauses. Natural
gas consumers can, therefore, only hope that the legislature heeds Judge
Doyle's logical position.
C.

Geophysical Exploration: Mustang Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc.

In Mustang Production Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 116 the Tenth Circuit held
that, absent an express agreement in a lease, there is no exclusive right
109. 758 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985). The Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion in this case,
604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1981), is discussed in Eighth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Lands and
Natural Resources, 58 DEN. L.J. 415, 433 (1981). In addition, a similar Tenth Circuit opinion, Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1982), is considered in Tenth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Lands and Natural Resources, 60 DEN. L.J. 333, 33343 (1983).
110. 758 F.2d at 502 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
Ill. Oil and Gas Conservation Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(2) (1984).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
113. 758 F.2d. at 502 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 503.
115. Id.
116. 754 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1985).
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to conduct geophysical exploration on land subject to oil and gas
leases. 117
Mustang filed suit against Texaco in both Kansas and Oklahoma,
seeking damages and an accounting for geophysical explorations conducted on land under lease to Mustang without Mustang's consent.
Texaco moved to dismiss the actions in both states on the grounds that
Mustang had failed to state a cause of action because Mustang did not
have an exclusive right to conduct such exploration. Both courts dismissed the actions and Mustang appealed to the Tenth Circuit." 8
The Tenth Circuit cited several authorities for the rule that the right
to conduct geophysical exploration is a valuable property right with the
concommitant right in the landowner to recover for entry upon his land
without his consent to conduct such exploration." 19 The court noted,
however, that the exclusive right of exploration of the lessee under the
0
leases was not expressed and would, therefore, have to be implied.12
Implied rights in an oil and gas lease are an essential part of the
lessee's rights to produce under a lease. The court cited the right to
ingress and egress and the right to conduct geophysical exploration as
examples of implied rights.' 2 ' The court, however, stated that such
rights are normally non-exclusive because the landowner retains the
right to make use of his property in any way that does not interfere with
22
the lessee's right to develop the lease.'
The court noted that the exclusive right to drill is an essential aspect of the lessee's right to produce oil and gas upon leased land, and
courts have implied that this is an exclusive right when the lease is silent.' 23 The court further noted that a non-exclusive right to conduct
geophysical exploration does not prevent the lessee from reducing the
oil and gas under the property to his possession. 12 4 Thus, the court was
not convinced by Mustang's argument that exploration would promote
drilling adjacent to Mustang's leases and thereby interfere with Mustang's orderly development of its leases by forcing Mustang to drill offset wells because such drilling could occur with or without
25
exploration. '
The court concluded that the public interest was furthered by allowing exploration in order to encourage the continuing development
of oil and gas lands. 12 Because no other jurisdiction had implied an
117. Id. at 895.
118. Id. at 892.
119. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303, 306 (10th Cir. 1943); Wilson v. Texas Co., 237 S.W.2d 649
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951); and I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 230 (5th ed.
1982)).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Mustang Production, 754 F.2d at 893-94.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id.
Id.

125. Id. at 895.
126. Id.

1986]

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES

exclusive right to conduct geophysical exploration and several commentators have supported a non-exclusive right, the court was unwilling to
imply an exclusive right.12 7 The court, thus, left it to the lessee to expressly contract for an exclusive right to conduct geophysical explora28
tion if the lessee finds it advantageous.1
III.

A.

INDIAN LAW

Tribal Termination and Hunting Rights: United States v. Felter

The Tenth Circuit continued its traditional role as an important forum for legal issues involving Indian affairs with its decision in United
States v. Felter, 12 9 which construed the rights of tribal members when federal jurisdiction has been terminated. The court considered whether a
mixed-blood Ute Indian retained the right to hunt and fish within the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation after Congress terminated federal supervision over the property of mixed-blood members of the tribe. 130 In
upholding Felter's right to continue to hunt and fish within the reservation, the Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Holloway writing, relied heavily on
the Supreme Court's decision in Menominee Tribe v. United States, '3 ' which
held that the Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954 did not abro32
gate the hunting and fishing rights of the Menominee Indians.'
The government attempted to distinguish Felter from Menominee on
two grounds. The first ground was that the law that granted states jurisdiction over Indians did not apply to Utah as it had to Wisconsin (the
home of the Menominee Tribe). 133 The second ground was that the
Utes' right to hunt and fish was based on an act of Congress instead of a
treaty, which the Supreme Court had cited as the decisive factor in Me127. Id. (citing 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 218.6 (5th ed. 1982);
Martin, Geophysical Exploration on Severed Mineral Interests in Oklahoma, 36 OKLA. B.A.J. 1889,
1894 (1968); Comment, Implied Rights of the Oil and Gas Owner in the Surface, 26 RocKy MTN.
L. REV. 277, 287 (1954).

128. 754 F.2d at 895.
129. 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985).
130. Act of August 27, 1954, ch. 1009, 68 Stat. 868 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 6 7 7 -677aa
(1982)) [hereinafter cited as the 1954 Act]. The 1954 Act provided that an individual
mixed-blood member of the Ute Tribe was no longer "entitled to any of the services performed for Indians because of his status as an Indian." 25 U.S.C. § 677v (1982).
131. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
132. 752 F.2d at 1508. In Menominee. the Supreme Court held that although the Menominee Indian Termination Act did not specifically address hunting and fishing rights,
the Act had to be read inpari materia with Public Law 280, Act of August 15, 1953, ch. 505,
67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-1326 (1982)), which granted to certain states general jurisdiction over "Indian
country," but with the proviso that "[n]othing in this section... shall deprive any Indian
or Indian tribe . . . of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty,
agreement or statute with respect to hunting, trapping or fishing or the control, licensing
or regulation thereof." Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1968).
The right to hunt and fish derived from an 1854 treaty. Id. at 406.
133. Before a state can assume jurisdiction under Public Law 280, supra note 132, it
must first obtain the consent of the Indian tribe(s) to be affected. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 132 1(a),
1322(a) (1982). No Indian tribes in Utah, including the Utes, have given this consent.
Felter, 752 F.2d at 1508 n.7.
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nominee. 134 The district court, however, refused to distinguish the case
from Menominee and held that the factual differences should not change
the court's adherence to the principle of "declin[ing] to construe the Act
as a backhanded way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of
these Indians." 135
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the 1954 Act did not specifically abrogate the mixed-blood members' right to hunt and fish on reservation
land.13 6 This conclusion comports with the established doctrine that Indian hunting and fishing rights cannot be abrogated in the absence of
explicit congressional language. 137 The court also followed the line of
cases, beginning with Menominee and including the Tenth Circuit case of
Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 1 38 which have held, in a
variety of factual situations, that Indian hunting and fishing rights can
survive the termination of tribal status, the withdrawal from tribal membership, the cession of tribal lands to the United States, and the dises1 39
tablishment of a reservation.
The government argued that the 1954 Act "unambigously" abrogated the rights of the mixed-blood Utes. The court, however, pointed
out that the Act never mentioned hunting and fishing rights, but instead
provided that mixed-blood members would retain no interest in the
tribe unless provided for by the Act. The court then cited a section of
the Act that provides that mixed-blood members are to retain their
40
rights to assets that cannot be equitably and practicably distributed.'
The district court had pointed out, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that
fishing and hunting rights and the authority to regulate those rights cannot be equitably and practicably distributed. 14 ' In interpreting the Act,
the court relied on the canon of statutory construction that "statutes
passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes . . . are to be liberally
construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians."' 142 The court soundly rejected the government's argument that
the canon should be interpreted only in favor of the full-blooded members of the tribe because the mixed-bloods are no more than "ordinary
American citizens." 143 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that prior to the
1954 Act the mixed-blood Ute Indians had the right to hunt and fish on
the reservation, an attribute that clearly sets them apart from "ordinary
44
American citizens" who did not enjoy such a right.'
134. Id. at 1508.
135. 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (D. Utah 1982) (quoting Menominee, 391 U.S. at 412).
136. Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509.
137. See, e.g., F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 468-70 (1982 ed.).
138. 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980). The other cases cited include Kimball v. Callahan,
493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974) and Klamath Indian Tribe v.
Oregon Dept. of Fish and Wildlife, 729 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 105

S. Ct. 3420 (1985).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Felter, 752 F.2d at 1509-10.
Id. at 1510.
Id. at 1511.
Id. (quoting Alaska Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
Felter, 752 F.2d at 1511-12.
Id. at 1512.
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The Tenth Circuit also agreed with the district court that before the
government could convict Felter of a criminal violation, it had the burden of showing that Felter had violated tribal fishing regulations and
14 5
that the government had failed to meet this burden.
B.

Indian Contracts and Tribal Funds: Sac & Fox Tribe v. Apex
Construction Co.

In Sac & Fox Tribe v. Apex Construction Co.,' 4 6 the Tenth Circuit emphasized the distinction between tribal funds, which belong to Indian
tribes and are managed by the United States for the tribes' benefit, and
public monies of the United States. 147 The Sac and Fox Tribe of
Oklahoma (Tribe) had used grant money from the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce to build a museum and cultural center. Several years later, the Tribe discovered
severe defects in the buildings and brought suit against the construction
contractor, the contractor's surety under a performance bond, and the
design engineering firm. 148 The Tribe sought recovery of all monies
paid under the contract on the theory that the contracts were void for
failure to obtain approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 149 In the al15 0
ternative, they sought damages for breach of contract.
The statutory requirement for federal approval of all contracts with
Indian tribes or individuals arises from the trust relationship between
the federal government and Indians. 1 5 1 At the time this requirement
was established, it was regarded as advancing the policy that Indians had
to be protected from unscrupulous white men who would swindle them
out of their lands through contracts for "imaginary services costing exorbitant amounts.' 5 2 This concern arose at a time when the Indian
tribes were considered incapable of protecting themselves from more
sophisticated whites.
In this case, the Tribe attempted to use the approval requirement to
invoke the protection of the federal statute, instead of using civil remedies available in the state courts.1 53 The Tribe most likely believed that
145. Id. at 1512-13. Ms. Felter was a non-Indian for federal purposes after passage of
the 1954 Act, supra note 130. Indian tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indians
for criminal offenses. Tribes do, however, have the right to regulate nonmember hunting

and fishing under 18 U.S.C. § 1165, including the right to exclude nonmembers. See F.
COHEN, supra note 137, at 465-66. Presumably the Tribe would have the power to exclude
the terminated members of the Tribe, but the government failed to show any evidence that
Ms. Felter violated tribal regulations.
146. 757 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1985).
147. Id. at 222-23.
148. Id. at 221-22.
149. Id. at 222. Approval of contracts between Indians and non-Indians by the Secretary of the Interior is required by 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982). Unapproved contracts are declared void under the statute.
150. 757 F.2d at 222.
151. Id. at 222-23.
152. Id. at 222 (quoting the unpublished record from the district court. Record, vol. 1,
at 270).
153. 757 F.2d at 222.
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it would receive a more sympathetic ear in a federal court than in a state
court and that the statute's provision for return of all monies paid by the
Tribe would almost certainly result in a more generous recovery than
that which could have been obtained in a breach of contract suit.
Unfortunately for the Tribe, neither the district court nor the Tenth
Circuit found the statute to be applicable to this situation. 15 4 The
Tenth Circuit, citing Brown v. United States,1 55 held that the statute applies only to monies derived from tribal funds.15 6 The grant monies
used for this project were not connected to tribal funds held in trust by
the government. Thus, the court concluded that the procedural requirements of the grant were sufficient protection for the Tribe and that the
construction contracts did not require the specific approval of the
Secretary. 157
The distinction between tribal funds and public monies has been
recognized by the Supreme Court since

19 0 8

158 and has been upheld as

recently as 1970.1511 Consistent with these prior decisions, the Tenth
Circuit held that grant monies do not come within the purview of the
statute. I 60

Timothy A. Richman

154. Id.
155. 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973).
156. "Tribal funds are principally raised through the sale of tribal resources or through
treaty payments by the United States for land cessions or other dispositions of tribal property. Although these funds belong to the Tribe, they are held in trust by the United States
and are administered by the Department of Interior." Sac & Fox Tnibe, 757 F.2d at 223. See
generallY F. COHEN, supra note 137. at ch. 9, § D.
157. Sac & Fox Tr4be, 757 F.2d at 222.
158. Quick Bear v.Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
denied, 400 U.S. 942
159. Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert.
(1970).
160. Sac & Fox Tribe, 757 F.2d at 223.

